Who Is Behind the Violence in Northern Nigeria?
By Steven Kefas
Nigeria is often portrayed in international headlines as simply “unstable,” a sweeping, unhelpful label that conceals a far more complex and geographically specific crisis. For those seeking to understand the country’s security situation, the details matter enormously.
Over the past ten years, I have conducted extensive field research across Nigeria with a particular focus on the north, carrying out on-the-ground interviews with victim communities, local leaders, survivors, and witnesses. What I found challenges vague narratives and points to identifiable actors perpetrating the majority of violence in two critical regions: the Northwest and the North Central.
Systematic data gathered by the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) consistently records a significant proportion of Christian victims even in predominantly Muslim northwestern states, evidence that the violence carries a dimension that purely ethnic or economic explanations cannot fully account for. This piece argues that the crisis is best understood as ethno-religious in character: rooted in ethnic identity, but inflected with religious targeting that demands honest acknowledgment.
The Northwest: Bandits, or Something More?
In Nigeria’s Northwest comprising states such as Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, and Kaduna, the dominant perpetrators of mass violence are armed groups widely referred to as “bandits.” This label, while useful as shorthand, does not fully capture the sophistication, the ethnic profile, or the religious dimensions of these actors.
After conducting field interviews across victim communities in this zone over ten years, my research found that at least 95% of the perpetrators are of Fulani origin. This finding is broadly consistent with what credible international and Nigerian bodies have documented.
Approximately 30,000 Fulani bandits operate in several groups in northwest Nigeria, with individual groups consisting of anywhere from 10 to 1,000 members. These are not loosely organized mobs. They are structured armed networks that have carved out territories, imposed illegal taxation on farming communities, and responded to resistance with lethal force.
This ethnic and religious identification of the bandits was confirmed publicly by one of Nigeria’s most senior political figures. In September 2021, then-Katsina State Governor Aminu Bello Masari, himself a Fulani man made an extraordinary admission on Channels Television’s “Politics Today” programme, stating that the bandits were “the same people like me, who speak the same language like me, who profess the same religious beliefs like me.”
He added that “majority of those involved in this banditry are Fulanis, whether it is palatable or not, but that is the truth,” and noted that some fighters had infiltrated from West and North African countries, all of Fulani extraction.
His candid acknowledgment effectively confirmed from within Nigeria’s political establishment what field researchers and affected communities had long documented.
What makes these groups particularly alarming is the level of weaponry in their possession. Bandit gangs notably downed a Nigerian Air Force Alpha Jet on 18 July 2021, a stunning demonstration of anti-aircraft capabilities. This is not the profile of ordinary criminals; it is the profile of an insurgent-level armed group .
The Religious Dimension in the Northwest
Framing the northwest violence purely as criminality or ethnic predation risks missing an important layer. ORFA data document a disproportionately high number of Christians among the dead in northwestern states, including Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, and Kebbi states where Christians are a demographic minority.
The targeting pattern is not random. Churches have been burned, Christian farming communities repeatedly selected for raids, and witnesses across multiple communities have reported attackers chanting Allahu Akbar during assaults. This does not make every attack a formally declared religious war, but it does mean that religion functions as a marker of who is targeted and who is spared in many attacks in the region.
The historical memory of the Usman Dan Fodio jihad of the early nineteenth century, which transformed the religious and political landscape of what is now northern Nigeria remains a live current in the identity of sections of the Fulani community. This does not reduce every Fulani herder to a jihadist. But it means the violence should be understood as ethno-religious in character: ethnicity and religion are intertwined as both motivation and method.
The term “ethno-religious warfare” captures this more accurately than either “religious warfare” (as practised by Boko Haram and ISWAP) or plain criminality. Minority Christian communities in the Muslim northwest have come under attacks in a manner that suggests they are being targeted. For example, in Faskari LGA of Katsina state, the ORF four-year report shows a significant number of Christians killed. Considering the small population of Christians in the LGA, there is no better explanation to the number killed than being targeted.
Furthermore, the convergence between bandit groups and declared jihadist networks adds an additional dimension to an already dangerous situation. ISWAP and Boko Haram factions including Ansaru, Mahmuda, and Lakurawa have claimed attacks in northwest Nigeria, and some bandit groups have reportedly forged alliances with these jihadist organisations.
The economic impact has been devastating regardless of motive. Armed Fulani militant networks have inflicted catastrophic damage on Nigeria’s economy and governance, with deliberate destruction of farms and grain stores triggering soaring food prices and nationwide food insecurity, and millions displaced since the crisis began.
The Middle Belt: Armed Herdsmen and Ethno-Religious Targeting
In Nigeria’s Middle Belt, covering states such as Plateau, Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Niger, and Kwara, the picture is similar in terms of perpetrator identity but different in framing. Here, the media refers to armed actors as “Armed Herdsmen” rather than bandits. My field research, spanning ten years of interviews in the Middle Belt, led me to the same conclusion as in the Northwest: over 95% of the perpetrators are of Fulani descent.
Attacks on 23 to 24 December 2023 in Plateau State left at least 200 people dead and more than 500 injured across no fewer than 20 rural communities in Bokkos and Barkin Ladi Local Government Areas, were attributed to Fulani militants. Less than two years later, on 14 June 2025, at least 258 Christians were brutally murdered in Yelwata, Benue State, in an attack attributed to armed Fulani militia fighters.
These are not isolated incidents. They form part of a sustained and escalating pattern of violence against settled farming communities, communities that are overwhelmingly Christian, carried out with apparent impunity and, in documented accounts, accompanied by religious invocations.
The Nasarawa Connection
Field research and security reporting have established that some of the most lethal Fulani militant groups operating across the Middle Belt do not simply emerge from within the states they attack. Several armed groups have maintained known encampments in Nasarawa State, using these as staging posts for coordinated raids into Plateau, Benue, Taraba, and other Middle Belt states.
This cross-state operational pattern, attackers arriving, killing, and retreating to camps across state line has frustrated local security responses and allowed militant networks to strike with impunity while remaining outside the effective jurisdiction of any single state authority. This is not a local herder dispute; it is a coordinated militant operation with identifiable logistics, known geography, and a command structure that must be addressed at both federal and state levels.
Religious Markers in Middle Belt Attacks
The ethno-religious character of the Middle Belt attacks is well-documented, and the evidence is substantial. Across multiple states and many years of field interviews, survivors and witnesses have consistently reported the following:
Burning of churches. The deliberate targeting and destruction of Christian places of worship has been documented in attacks across Plateau, Benue, Taraba, and Southern Kaduna. In numerous incidents, church buildings are primary targets, not incidental casualties of fighting.
Chants of Allahu Akbar. Multiple survivor testimonies, corroborated by field researchers and documented record attackers chanting “God is Greatest” in Arabic during raids on Christian communities. This is not consistent with violence that has no religious dimension.
Targeting of pastors and their families. Church leaders have been disproportionately killed or abducted in attacks across the Middle Belt. The deliberate elimination of religious leaders signals an intent that goes beyond land and grazing disputes.
These patterns do not mean that every armed Fulani herder is motivated primarily by religion, or that ecological pressures are irrelevant. But when attackers burn churches, announce their actions in religious terms, and single out pastors for killing, the violence has crossed into ethno-religious territory that demands a different analytical and policy response.
Governor Elrufai’s Admission
The identity of the perpetrators responsible for killings in Southern Kaduna was confirmed by the state’s own governor. In December 2016, then-Kaduna State Governor Nasir Elrufai made a public admission that he had identified the killers as Fulani, including foreign Fulani fighters from Cameroon, Niger Republic, Chad, Mali, and Senegal.
Rather than pursuing legal accountability, Elrufai disclosed that his government sent emissaries across borders to appeal to these individuals to stop the killings, because he, as governor, was Fulani like them. He stated plainly that he sent people to tell them “there is a new governor who is Fulani like them and has no problem paying compensations for lives lost and he is begging them to stop killing.”
What the World Needs to Understand
The violence in northern Nigeria is not random or faceless. Field research consistently points to identifiable armed groups, predominantly of Fulani origin, operating with sophisticated weapons, organised command structures, cross-state logistics, and ethno-religious motivations that make the label “farmer-herder conflict” dangerously inadequate.
Framing this crisis as mere “ethnic conflict” or “farmer-herder clashes” serves several false purposes: it implies mutual fault between two equal parties, it erases the religious dimension of targeting, and it obscures the organised, predatory, and often one-sided nature of attacks on civilian communities. ORFA data demonstrate clearly that Christians bear a disproportionate share of the killing, not only in the Middle Belt, where this might seem demographically predictable, but in northwestern states where Christians are a distinct minority. That pattern is not an accident of geography; it is evidence of targeting.
For policymakers, aid organisations, and international observers, understanding who the perpetrators are and what drives them is not an exercise in blame. It is a prerequisite for crafting responses that can actually protect lives.
The communities I interviewed are not statistics. They are people who have survived raids, buried their dead, seen their churches burned, and are still waiting for meaningful intervention.
This crisis demands a response commensurate with its actual character: ethno-religious violence, prosecuted by organised armed groups, with identifiable actors, documented methods, and a regional geography that crosses state and national borders.
Steven Kefas has conducted field research across northern Nigeria for over ten years. Data referenced from ORFA (Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa) is available at http://www.orfa.africa . For previous reporting on these communities, see the author’s coverage in www.middlebelttimes.com
